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Digital currency is primarily designed on problems that are computationally hard to
solve using traditional computing techniques. However, these problems are now
vulnerable due to the computational power of quantum computing. For the
postquantum computing era, there is an immense need to reinvent the existing
digital security measures. Problems that are computationally hard for any quantum
computation will be a possible solution to that. This research summarizes the current
security measures and how the newway of solving hard problemswill trigger the
future protection of the existing digital currency from the future quantum threat.
Motivation: Cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin,Etherium, and others are taking the worldby storm. It is a decentralized digital cur-
rency free from any government or institutional
interference and can operate in an open, peer-to-
peer network. The mining of these coins and trans-
actions heavily relies on cryptographic computa-
tional complexity. Cryptographic protocols provide
the foundation for securing all blockchain opera-
tions like Tamper Resistance, Equivocation Preven-
tion, and new CC units. Hash functions make it
possible to represent data efficiently and formulate
cryptographic puzzles for proof-of-work (PoW)
schemes. Digital signature algorithms based on pub-
lic-key cryptography allow assurances of identity
and origin for blockchain transactions. The break-
through of a quantum computation (QC) could
threaten the whole mining and transaction proce-
dure by breaking the cryptographic barrier. As QC
will solve a large number of decomposition problems
and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm in a short
time, it will make RSA and Elliptic-curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC)-based security armor vulnerable.
The industry is now searching to find out quan-
tum-proof hard problems, such as the shortest vec-
tor problem and the closest vector problem, which
are considered the most reliable hard problems for
resisting QC. However, these are not convincing
enough to protect cryptocurrency. As illustrated in
Figure 1, in this research, we explained that QC
could increase blockchain vulnerability using error-
correction speedup, Shor’s, and Grover’s algorithms,
and we could address this vulnerability by improving
digital signature and PoW.
BACKGROUND
Quantum Computer
The basic unit of quantum calculation is q-bit or
quantum bit. Unlike classical 1-bit information, a q-
bit represents a superposition of 0 and 1. That is, a
q-bit has some probability of being 0 and some
probability of being 1, just like the experiment of
Schrodinger’s cat, which is dead and alive at the
same time. This opens the door to hold multiple
states of a machine, which is counterintuitive in the
lens of Newtonian physics. The serial searching that
created the barrier for a classical model can now be
broken by multiple search paths simultaneously due
to q-bit can represent all the search paths simulta-
neously. To put it simply, this allows QC to process
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calculations that vastly exceed the potential of clas-
sic computers. Although this is still theoretical, but
the threat is real and imminent.
The first QC appeared in 2013. It was developed by
the Canadian company D-Wave. Even though many
specialists doubted its functionality, the Google repre-
sentatives confirmed that this computer is convenient
for particular calculations. The technological giant
purchased a working prototype and tested it for an
extended period. The results of the testing were
released in the form of scientific work.
Cryptocurrency and How They Use
Cryptography
Bitcoin extensively uses SHA-256 (256-bit secure hash
algorithm) for several operations. RIPEMD-160 is used
in address creation. Original Bitcoin wallet used AES-
256-CBC for encrypting all private keys using a master
key, and an SHA-512 hash encrypted the master key
from the user passphrase. Elliptic Curve DSA is used
to generate “Wallet” addresses and sign transactions.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
especially secp256k1, is rarely used outside of Bitcoin,
though it is an international standard that is generally
accepted as secure.
Bitcoins use the concept of so-called “Proof ofWork
(Pow),”which are solutions to certain challenging cryp-
tographic puzzles based on hash functions. These solu-
tions are not Bitcoins. The puzzles are more of a part of
the Bitcoin trust architecture. In reality, the puzzles are
joined together to make a chain and as the length of
this chain extends, so does the level of security. Bit-
coins are handover to those who produce these “PoW,”
which is a very difficult computationally complex task.1
In a nutshell, Bitcoin miners make money when they
find a 32-bit value, which, when hashed together with
the data from other transactions with a standard hash
function, gives a hash with a certain number of 60 or
more zeros. This is an infrequent event. It is, in general,
believed that there is no way to produce these data
otherwise than by engaging in very long and costly
computation.2 After the mined coin ownership of Bit-
coins is achieved through digital signatures, the owner
of a specific private key is the owner of a certain quan-
tity of Bitcoins. This private key is a unique way to
transfer Bitcoin to another computer or person. Cryp-
tographic computations get executed by a peer-to-
peer network of a growing network of currently some
20,000 independent nodes,2 which is the heart of the
security assurance provided by this virtual currency
system. It would be challenging and too costly for one
entity to corrupt all these independent people. The
sum of all this collective computational work provides
a solid cryptographic proof and prevents attacks on
this system. There is a specific sort of distributed and
decentralized electronic notary system without a cen-
tral authority.3
We can divide quantum attack on cryptocurrency
in three parts.
› Attack on PoW: PoW is a form of cryptographic
proof, which is used to validate a cartographic
transaction and with QC, miners will be able to
mine coins a lot faster compared to other min-
ers. In such a scenario, 51% attack on PoW
becomes easier to achieve.4
› Attack on signature schemes (SS): SS verify the
integrity and nonrepudiation of transaction mes-
sages using time-complexity cryptography and
with QC, provides reduced operations, hence
allowing to users to breach private keys
(signatures).
› Zero Day attack: It refers to the vulnerability/
bug of software or a system to hackers before a
possible solution is introduced. Most of these
attacks are SQL injections, authorization breach,
unauthorized data encryption, etc. We assume
that it is possible that rise of QC will initiate
some zero-day attacks.
Basics of Grover’s Algorithm
Grover’s algorithm is one of the searching quantum
algorithms for an unsorted database system in
FIGURE 1. Balance between QC and defense mechanism for
blockchain vulnerability.
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Oð ffi½p 2NÞ time with storage space OðlogNÞ. Applica-
tions of Grover’s algorithm include the estimation of
mean and median of numbers, collision problems, and
solving NP-complete problems. The idea of Grover’s
algorithm is the inversion of function y ¼ fðxÞ, where
given the value of y, it calculates or determines the
corresponding value of x.a
Basics of Shor’s Algorithm
To understand how quantum affects the digital signa-
ture, we need to know some basics of Shor’s algo-
rithm, which solves integer factorization. In number
theory, integer factorization is the decomposition of a
composite number into a product of smaller integers.
If these integers are further restricted to prime num-
bers, the problem is called prime factorization. This
was the base of many cryptographic algorithms, such
as elliptic curves. When the number was enormous,
there was no efficient algorithm to solve it. But Shor’s
algorithm5 shows that in a QC, it is possible to solve.
This is pictured through a graphical representation
shown in Figure 2. Here, the classical algorithm took
exponential CPU operations when the number of dig-
its increases, but QC has a constant amount of
operations.b
Due to the existence of Shor’s algorithm, integer
factorization is in bounded-error quantum polynomial
time (BQP) class, which is the quantum analog of the
complexity class bounded-error probabilistic polyno-
mial time (BPP). A decision problem is in BPP if there
exists a polynomial time algorithm such that it out-
puts “yes” with probability  2=3 when the true
answer is “yes” and it outputs “yes” with probability 
1=3 when the true answer is “no.” But integer factori-
zation is not a decision problem, rather it is polyno-




Effect of Grover’s Algorithm
Grover algorithm6 can speedup a search problem. If
we need to search an item x in the list with N items,
classical algorithms require minimum N=2 and worst-
case N time, but Grover’s algorithm will take
ffi½p 2N.
Therefore, a miner with a QC can mine a coin faster
than other miners without a QC.7 Moreover, Grover’s
algorithm can be used to breach cryptographic
hashing.
One way around it is to move to SHA-512 or SHA-
1025 and increase the amount of work for the crypto-
graphic proof, but it does not solve the problem
entirely. It just makes it a little a more time-consuming
for a QC.
Effect of Shor’s Algorithm
Shor’s algorithm changes the landscape of post-
quantum computation entirely. It shows that if
Shor’s algorithm is implemented, digital signatures
such as the elliptic curve and RSA will be broken.
This means we cannot continue using signatures
based on the factorization problem and the discrete
logarithm problem. Anyone with a QC can find the
private key if they have public access due to a
reduced number of operations (1,283 operations for
QC). So it can let anyone impersonate other users,
thus open the way to steal money, which will bring
the whole financial system down.7 As discussed in
the “Effect of Grover’s Algorithm” section, Shor’s
algorithm is potentially able the break the crypto-
graphic basis of prime factorization. Fortunately, the
current technology can only work with few q-bits
(specifically at most seven q-bits) that limits the
Shor’s algorithm’s power over large integers. Obvi-
ously, this technological limitation is expected to be
broken soon. This is where the present crypto-
graphic assumptions are at stake. Today or tomor-
row, the current security measures are going to be
obsolete.
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Effect of Error-Correction Speedup
Classical error-correction code needs overhead for
state distillation, error syndrome extraction, and cor-
rection. However, this slowdown would not be
required for a QC. It could be, given the advantage of
designing a more complex cryptographic algorithm
and securing the system. Also, reductions in the quan-
tum circuits’ logical gate counts are possible as more
efficient advanced QC techniques are being devel-
oped.8 In recent work,9 several orders of magnitude
improvement between old and new linear systems
solving quantum algorithms are shown. Also, the dif-
ferent quantum algorithms might have different
speedups, and the overhead for quantum error correc-
tion is likely reduced as the phased in the quantum
Fourier transform part of the circuit need not be as




PoW needs to have two basic properties: the prob-
lem’s difficulty must be must harder and can be
increased or decreased based on the computing
powers available in the network, but verifying this
PoW should be much cheaper than finding the solu-
tion. Our discussion in the “Postquantum Security
Concerns” section establishes that it also needs to
make sure that there is no quantum advantage.
Currently, some algorithms are proposed, which
consider this, such as Cuckoo Cycle,10 which is based
on finding constant-sized subgraphs in random
graphs. Another one is Equihash,11 which is based on
the generalized birthday problem. Also, we can con-
sider the Momentum12 focusing on collision finding in
a hash function.
Mostly, all of them are built on hash-cash style
PoW,8 which shows that even with the use of the
Grover search, we have also to have necessity to an
extra query of additional time by the quantum query
lower bound. Suppose that this minimum spare time is
S. All QCs have to consider this extra S time, whatever
the quantum algorithm they used.8
Improving Digital Signature
In the blockchain, the most crucial thing in the signa-
ture key is the length of public access. There are sev-
eral postquantum cryptographic techniques to
secure public keys. Some notable techniques include
the following. GPV is a creation of various trapdoor
cryptographic function having preimage sampling,
simple and efficient signatures, and identity-based
encryption.13 Bimodal Lattice Structure Scheme
(BLISS) is a modification of a rejection-sampling algo-
rithm that samples bimodal Gaussian distribution
with modified scheme instantiation and improves the
standard deviation of signatures with security levels
128, 160 and 192 bits.14 DILITHIUM is an advanced sig-
nature plot that is emphatically secure beneath the
chosen message assaults based on the hardness of
grid issues over module cross sections. The security
idea implies that an enemy having to get to a mark-
ing prophet cannot create a signature of a message
whose signature he has not, however, seen, nor cre-
ate a distinctive signature of a message that he as of
now saw marked.15 RAINBOW is a new way of calcu-
lating cryptanalytic data with variable chain length
resulting in reduced operations and lesser time for
crashing password hashes.16 Extended Merkle signa-
ture scheme (XMSS) is a hash-based signature
scheme in the pseudo-random and second preimage
resistant hash group with reduced signature size less
than 25% compared to other schemes.17 SPHINX is a
mechanism to relay cryptographic information in a
mixed network that supports indistinguishable
replies, hidden path length, and relay position, and
unlinkability among the information over the net-
work.18 QUARTZ is a 128-bit signature scheme based
on modified Hidden Field Equations (HFE).
In XMSS, it was assumed that the chosen hash
function is a random oracle, and QC can use Grover’s
algorithm. As we know, this means half of the time
needed in a QC than that in the classical computer.
But if we see the lattice-based signature scheme, we
can see that it has a better advantage than hash-
based. For example, DILITHIUM at 138 bit provides the
same level of security in both classical and QC. We
represented mentioned signature key in Figure 3 to
provide the visual comparison of their key size.
Recently, one limitation of the lattice-based
encryption schemes was found, such as BLISS, which
relied on the NP-hardness of the NTRU problem, and
the assumption is, to solve this problem is equal to
getting a short vector in a so-called NTRU lattice.
Recently, it was proved by Paul Kirchner19 that this
technique is not suitable for broad parameters; also, it
is not easy to implement based on Aggarwal et al.’s
works.8
Query Complexity and Cryptographic
Lower Bounds
In 2017,20 a new total search problem called End-of-
the-Metered-Line was introduced to study the hard-
ness of continuous local search, which is similar in
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spirit to the End-of-the-Line problem. This could
extend cryptographic ability to work on a QC.
OPEN QUESTIONS
As PoW can change its hardness based on the
entire network computation power, there are many
workarounds to adjust q-bits. However, more of a
concern is the security of digital signatures over the
network. The lattice-based signature scheme exhib-
its promise, but it is subject to cache attacks such
as cumulative distribution table (CDT) sampling and
rejection sampling.7 Several countermeasures were
proposed, but we can still not establish a quantum-
level signature scheme, which is equivalent to its
classical counterpart. We need to find a more com-
plex class problem to use which will have the same
hardness for quantum and classical computers.
SUMMARY
Already a lot of research to prepare for the postquan-
tum era has been conducted. Currently, it seems that
a further extension of lattice-based signature
schemes will be the answer if its limitations were miti-
gated, and the age of RSA and ECDSA is going to be
over for sure. Although Shamir, one of the RSA inven-
tors, suggested that nothing could prevent crypto-
graphic death, we should prepare for an open
cryptographic world. However, many other specialists
refuted him, and lots of countermeasures are being
developed. This indicates that, in the next decade, we
will observe a research trend to prevent cryptographic
death in the quantum era.
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